The eighth episode of Season II of Budget Talks is dedicated to Ukraine’s recovery. On what terms does Ukraine receive reconstruction funding? Why is recovery impossible without special conditions for businesses in frontline regions? What should Ukrainians who lost their homes expect? Why is the Ukraine Recovery Conference important, and what did Ukraine manage to bring back from Rome?
In this episode, Victor Maziarchuk, Head of the Fiscal Policy Research Center, and Alyona Shkrum, First Deputy Minister for Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine, discuss the prospects of recovery and the resources needed to make it possible.
VICTOR:
Hello!
ALYONA:
Good afternoon!
“At URC, we brought back the largest portfolio of potential investments, support, and concrete agreements”
VICTOR:
I’m really glad to see you. Finally, it happened — today on Budget Talks we have Alyona Shkrum, First Deputy Minister for Communities and Territories Development. Welcome. Let’s jump straight into it. The Ukraine Recovery Conference — another massive gathering. I had the chance to be there, to see it with my own eyes. The scale was enormous. I heard many people questioning whether such conferences are even necessary. My view: absolutely yes. Why? Because it shows our partners — on whom we critically depend for financing — what we are doing. It helps us build those contacts. So tell me, what are your impressions? What results can we summarize so far from URC?
ALYONA:
Honestly, I consider myself lucky. This is now my ninth month working at the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development. Before that, I was a Member of Parliament. I attended two of the three previous URC conferences. And to be frank — there’s no point hiding it — those earlier conferences were not really about reconstruction. They weren’t called “recovery conferences” in practice. They were about political support: signing memorandums, making promises — not necessarily delivering — and amplifying each other’s messages.
We would go there to ask, to talk about the war, about suffering, about defense spending, and so on. But this URC felt like the first true “recovery conference.” And that was very clear — the sheer concentration of business, investment funds, and banks ready to provide money. That’s why I feel fortunate, since investment is one of my direct areas of responsibility at the ministry. And this time we came back with the largest portfolio of potential investments, support, and concrete agreements. That’s something to be proud of. It was the work of a massive team.
VICTOR:
If I may, let me read a quote from your Facebook:
“Today I woke up with a sense of panic that I had to run again somewhere, fix agreements, prepare panels and memorandums. And then I realized — no, not anymore. Well, not because of URC, at least. The last 3–4 months working on the conference felt like one endless day. A thousand crises every day.”
And then you listed certain figures. Could you share those numbers with some interesting details?
ALYONA:
Sure. Stop me if I go on too long — I could complain about this conference for hours, it was that complex. We were one of the co-organizing ministries — alongside the Ministry of Finance, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of Economy. Working with the Italians was not easy. But this is exactly why such conferences matter. People say: “Just another conference.” But the truth is, without it, we would not have signed the agreements we signed there. Because in the run-up, we push everyone. We press the Italians, we press the British. We pressure the banks: “Hold your board meeting, approve these funds.” We push NGOs, development agencies like UNDP. Without the conference, they would’ve taken it slowly. But at URC, everyone wants to go on stage and announce a number, claim a victory, tick a box.
We don’t care who gets the credit. We’re happy to thank anyone a thousand times, as the President says. What matters is that the money comes in for Ukraine’s recovery. And we returned with a portfolio of agreements, commitments, and memorandums worth €3.6 billion. Now, to the average person, that figure may not mean much. But believe me, right now we are literally fighting for every $15 million. Grants are becoming rarer. We managed to secure a significant share of grants.
And what are grants? Free money. “Here, spend it.” That’s almost gone now. Most of the funding we get these days comes as concessional loans — cheap loans, though not as cheap as they used to be. The best terms we secured are 30 years at 3.5%. Our children will still be repaying those debts in 30 years. There’s usually a 10-year grace period, but then you start paying 3.5% interest continuously. And frankly, we have already accumulated more debt than we can really afford. You, as a finance expert, know this better than me. This isn’t “free help” — banks profit from this money.
But here’s what I am proud of: we signed three intergovernmental agreements with Italy — our first such agreements with Italy. And these are not loans, but grants. For example:
Over €30 million for restoring Odesa’s cultural heritage, much of which is UNESCO-listed and historically linked to Italy. Essentially, the whole cultural center of Odesa, now being destroyed, will be restored with Italian support.
An agreement on irrigation in Odesa region, crucial for our farmers and agriculture. Also grants.
And soon, an agreement for a new children’s hospital wing in Odesa. That one will be a loan, but on very favorable, almost zero-interest terms.
We also signed a €132 million deal for roads — through banks, not governments. This will support military logistics, evacuation routes, and other vital roads.
On housing, we signed for €100 million in compensation under the eRecovery program [Ukraine’s digital compensation mechanism for damaged property]. Even during the war, people can already receive compensation for damaged or destroyed homes. Additionally, we secured €80 million to begin compensations for people who lost homes in occupied territories — for the first time during the war. Until now, international partners wouldn’t even discuss this. Now it’s moving forward. And that’s a breakthrough.
Borodianka: How Comprehensive Recovery Works
VICTOR:
If you could, please tell us more about what’s happening there, because I see it’s being discussed a lot these days.
ALYONA:
Let me start with two words: what does “comprehensive recovery” even mean? Besides being a somewhat clumsy term (I’m still thinking of how to replace it). Up to now, the only approach the world has really used is step-by-step, object-by-object recovery. For example, a destroyed school: okay, the community applies for funds, uploads it to DREAM . The community knows it no longer has a school, no bomb shelter — either destroyed or never built — no functioning hospital, plus 35 damaged apartment buildings and 150 damaged private houses.
I’m not speaking in the abstract. In Borodianka we know, building by building, the extent of the destruction, because the town was 90% destroyed. This data goes into DREAM, and then funding is sought. But money is scarce. Some projects can get subventions from the ministry, others are financed through credit programs, some through grants, others via UNDP, or the Energy Efficiency Fund with its “VidnovyDIM” program. If you’re lucky, your project gets selected and funded. Meanwhile, as a ministry, we are officially responsible for restoring about 100,000 objects across Ukraine — but only in small steps, over five years. And frankly, this doesn’t work. Why not? Because we don’t necessarily need to rebuild every single facility. This is a difficult debate. For example, if there are no children left in a village, should we still rebuild the local school? Perhaps it’s better to build one modern school for the entire district and transport children there by bus. The old “piecemeal” approach — restoring something here, something there, as it used to be — doesn’t work. And we don’t want to rebuild “as it was” for many reasons. Take Borodianka’s housing stock: almost every building was destroyed or damaged, but most were old soviet-era blocks. So why would we restore them as they were? We need new technologies, barrier-free design, energy efficiency. We must build back better, not the same.
That requires analysis and expertise. For instance: is it cheaper to restore a soviet-era school, or simply build a new one? Sometimes new construction is both cheaper and more effective. The same goes for housing. These are hard questions, but unless we face them, we won’t move forward. The same logic applies to water systems. Just this morning I returned from Odesa region. You know the Recovery Agency is building a water pipeline for Mykolaiv, and has already launched the first water supply. But the goal wasn’t just to build a pipeline; the real goal was to deliver water. That’s not always the same thing. You have to calculate how much water is actually needed, how to reduce losses — currently up to 60% in some cities. The Agency, working with our ministry, managed to save ₴1.5 billion (about €35M) from the initial ₴8 billion budget, and that saving can now go into water purification and reducing network losses.
So, what distinguishes comprehensive recovery from object-by-object recovery? Instead of focusing on individual buildings, you take an entire settlement — a town, district, or village — that was heavily or catastrophically destroyed. You calculate: how many people live there now, how many internally displaced persons (IDPs) are there, how many people with special needs, how many jobs exist, and how many are needed. Then you decide: how much housing to rebuild, whether one school is enough or two, whether to restore an old soviet underground shelter or install modular shelters. In Borodianka, we’re piloting modular shelters for the first time. You probably saw one in Rome — we presented it at URC. The idea was simple: Ukraine can’t possibly build underground bunkers under every school or apartment block. It’s too expensive, beyond the capacity of any country. So how can we do it faster, cheaper, more effectively? Together with Ukrainian businesses, we came up with modular shelters. They’re assembled in three weeks, buried underground, cost five times less, and can protect 50 to 150 people — even more. That’s comprehensive recovery in practice: data, audits, analytics, and innovation. Europeans were amazed, because they’ve never had to do this.
VICTOR:
God willing, they’ll never have to.
ALYONA:
Exactly. So for us, Borodianka is a pilot of comprehensive recovery. We know the needs: the population, the IDPs, the jobs. We rebuild everything — roads, housing — with new technologies, energy efficiency, and accessibility. And we add the best possible services, test them, and try to make them affordable so they can be scaled to other towns. Because otherwise, it’s simply too expensive.
VICTOR:
What do you mean by “testing services”?
ALYONA:
For example, Borodianka will very soon be the first place in Ukraine to launch 5G. News outlets already reported on it. A simple example, but groundbreaking. Another: Borodianka will pilot a single electronic ticket for all forms of public transport. You top up, get a QR-code ticket, and use it on any mode of transport.
VICTOR:
Well, Kyiv already has something like that.
ALYONA:
Not everywhere. And here’s the key: it brings private carriers out of the shadow economy. They dislike it, since cash payments are easier to hide. But with e-tickets, transactions become transparent. Even in Borodianka it was difficult to implement, but we managed. I invite you to come to Borodianka soon — let’s walk around and see. Then we can replicate it elsewhere. We’re also preparing to launch an electric trolleybus powered by solar panels. Borodianka is long, so it will connect different ends of the town. The idea is to make it free for many groups of residents. The upfront investment is significant, but afterwards the trolleybus charges overnight from solar energy. These are the things we’re testing. But beyond that, we need to attract business — build an industrial park, create special preferences. We know Ukraine won’t be rebuilt without special opportunities for business in frontline areas.
VICTOR:
So this should be some form of public-private partnership?
ALYONA:
Yes — PPPs, but also tax incentives, easier grid connections, simplified land allocation. Remember: 70% of destruction is concentrated in 11 oblasts [regions] along the borders with russia, Belarus, and the Black Sea. Foreign investors, like the Italians, won’t go there if they can choose safer regions in Western Ukraine — unless they are attracted by extraordinary projects, strong opportunities, or special incentives.
VICTOR:
So you have to offer a risk premium, so investors know they’re taking a risk but getting higher returns.
ALYONA:
Exactly. Or the risk has to hold the potential to pay off fivefold in the future. That’s what makes it interesting for them. That’s the essence of comprehensive recovery: the big picture. Why Borodianka? People ask us all the time. Because it’s a town so heavily destroyed, such a symbol of resistance, that showing results there will shift mindsets — even among investors. Borodianka was 90% destroyed; today we’ve restored 75%. I strongly invite you to visit. I was there just two weeks after liberation. I still remember the smoke, everything blackened and burned.
VICTOR:
I was there on the fourth day after liberation.
ALYONA:
And now, if you come, you’ll see a living town, children laughing. We’re restoring not only infrastructure. For example, the Recovery Agency is creating an Urban Park. Some ask: “Why?” Because it gives people hope. When children returned to play there, the town suddenly looked as if the war had never touched it. That’s incredible. Today, more people live in Borodianka than before the war.
VICTOR:
Seriously?
ALYONA:
Yes.
VICTOR:
So that’s largely internally displaced people.
ALYONA:
Exactly. But that’s a good sign. With this pilot of comprehensive recovery, we want to show: here’s what was, here’s how catastrophic it was, here’s how people fled, leaving only burned-out ruins. And here’s what can be achieved with donor and bank support — faster and cheaper. People are returning, businesses will hopefully follow, maybe tourism. Then we can apply the best practices from Borodianka to other cities. That’s the plan.
The Largest Investment Project During the War
VICTOR:
Tell me, please—what is business saying it wants? Tax breaks and the like are clear. But are there already projects worth discussing? Including any large public-private partnership projects? PPPs are close to my heart—I remember 2010, when the law was adopted and the regulatory framework was drafted, and you just feel how important this is.
ALYONA:
Look, how do you attract business and what can you actually do? Either you announce a sweeping privatization and sell everything. Can we sell assets at a good price during a war? Some, yes—but not much. The other option is public-private partnerships under the new law: you don’t sell the asset, but hand over operations, or an investor—foreign or Ukrainian—comes in alongside the state. That can be water utilities, roads, hospitals—anywhere there’s a viable business model. Here’s a piece of news I haven’t shared publicly yet: yesterday in Odesa we signed, most likely, the largest PPP project in Ukraine’s history—at the Port of Chornomorsk. Not the entire port—just six berths (there are over forty)—but it has the potential, even during the war, to be the largest investment project in Ukraine’s history.
VICTOR:
Is it an international investor? And is this more than the 18 billion Ukraine received from ArcelorMittal?
ALYONA:
It will go to auction, so I don’t want to set expectations—but it will definitely be a major, serious deal. Why? First, it’s super transparent. We modeled all the scenarios and, I believe, chose the best ones. Financial modeling was done by Ernst & Young; that needs no introduction. We also have the EBRD and IFC [International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group]. You can’t do better. The six berths are currently loss-making—these are the container berths. That means the state pays every year just to maintain them. Why? Because container terminals require very large equipment investments. This is the container terminal of the Chornomorsk port. In Odesa, everyone knows it; all seafarers do. Back in 2008, it handled half a million containers a year—about 50% of all container traffic in Ukraine.
VICTOR:
And containers are lined up in rows…
ALYONA:
Right, but you need the equipment for containers—huge gantry cranes to lift them. It’s a complex, standardized system worldwide. You must have top-tier technology; otherwise container handling is painfully slow. And do you know how many containers currently pass through the six berths we’re offering for investment?
VICTOR:
Fifty?
ALYONA:
Zero (2024 data). Because the cranes are old; russia has bombed cranes; the equipment doesn’t work; and it needs investment. So as a state we faced a choice: either we take $100 million from the state budget (which we don’t have) and invest, or we sell (we don’t want to), or we concession out operations and invite an investor—best offer wins—through an auction for operational rights. Most of the world’s top ports are in concession. Piraeus in Greece is under concession; many European ports are too. Globally, there are around 50 companies that hold concessions for most major ports. At our recent roadshow in Warsaw, where we presented this project just a couple of months ago, 45 of the world’s top 50 companies came and said they are very interested—even during the war.
VICTOR:
They see huge potential.
ALYONA:
They do—and they’re not scared; they’re ready to wait out the war because they see the upside. We set minimal mandatory conditions: you can’t lay off staff for at least five years—there are currently about a thousand workers who need salaries but aren’t getting them because there’s no investment. You must invest at least $50 million in the first 3–4 years into cranes and getting the terminal working. We’ll write that into the terms. You must ensure, roughly, 230,000 TEU per year. We want the port to develop, not just sit idle under a management contract. We want local and national taxes paid, and wages paid. We want to kick-start the economy. We’ll take the best offer—and the best offer wins operational control.
“Ukraine is actually a super-interesting market and a super-interesting case.”
VICTOR:
That’s exciting. We’re all hopeful.
Tell me, were there any conversations at URC worth highlighting? There was a lot happening behind the scenes.
ALYONA:
Ukraine is, in fact, a super-interesting market and a super-interesting case. We’re a country at war—but the economy still functions. Many foreign businesses arrive with a “scorched earth” image in mind. When large Polish and Turkish business delegations visited recently, they assumed Kyiv was barely functioning and that Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipro were just wastelands—only military, nothing happening. That’s simply untrue. Why do we take them to the regions? Because the economy there still works—yes, at a lower level, under fire—but people pay taxes, rent apartments, sometimes even buy property, order pizza, do repairs, fix their homes using our eRecovery program. Money circulates—there is a market. People pay utility tariffs, water bills, delivery fees, taxi fares. We are nothing like Syria. Ukraine is a very compelling market. Kharkiv, for example, has over one million people—that’s a big market.
VICTOR:
Sure—even if a large share are internally displaced persons.
ALYONA:
Yes, but they pay and they’re financially active. Many IDPs are employed and self-supporting. That’s very different from, say, Yugoslavia during the war, or Syria. Zaporizhzhia region, though heavily affected, still has around 650,000 people (if I’m not mistaken). That’s significant. What does this mean? An investor who takes over a plant there, restarts operations, provides jobs—will turn a profit. Businesses are only now starting to see this. But they need de-risking mechanisms—guarantees against wartime risks. They need a clear pipeline of where to go. And they need PPP-type opportunities. Water utilities are highly interesting to everyone; ports too—we have a few more such projects. Housing and construction are also very attractive because Ukraine has an enormous housing need. We’re still figuring out how to bring investors into that space. There are domestic investors and a few models for structuring it—that’s a separate conversation.
“The amount of destroyed housing equals four Milans and fourteen Venices”
VICTOR:
Since you’ve touched on housing, please tell us about the municipal housing program. What’s being done, what’s the core idea, and what outcome do you expect?
ALYONA:
Housing is hard because the need is enormous. I’ll start with the bad news.
VICTOR:
I’ve seen estimates that 3.5 million people lost their homes.
ALYONA:
Here’s how I explain it to foreigners—because raw numbers mean little without comparisons. Today, across Ukraine, 37,000 multi-story residential buildings are either destroyed or heavily damaged. That’s only large apartment blocks. Add at least 320,000 private houses destroyed or damaged, plus 700 dormitories nationwide. I believe over 65,000 students lost their housing (and not only students). If you add it up, the scale of destroyed housing—collapsed roofs and all—is equivalent to four cities of Milan. In other words, russia bombed Ukraine’s housing to an extent comparable to wiping out four Milans. When we presented our project at the Venice Biennale—a giant “roof” installation—we calculated it equals fourteen Venices. Venetians don’t believe it; Italians don’t believe it—but it’s a fact. Ukraine is a large country, and the damage is that vast. Since World War II, almost no one has had to restore housing on that scale.
What do we do? Speaking very plainly: the state “has no money”—meaning, it only has taxpayers’ money, and in wartime most budget resources go to the military, not to rebuilding apartment blocks, let alone myriad small private homes. But people need places to live now. In any EU country, if that many people lost housing, you’d have a humanitarian catastrophe—people sleeping in stations, shelters, on the streets. We had temporary shelters too. But Ukrainians did something remarkable: Ukrainians housed Ukrainians. Some moved in with relatives or friends; others rented; some relocated to Western Ukraine; some went abroad and rent there. So the need is huge—especially as we ask people to come back. Where should they return to? What can we do? We can restore some housing directly—but not much, given limited funds. We can obtain grants from Europeans and pay cash compensations so people can repair or rebuild themselves, take loans, rebuild on their own land (using cheap credit or our grants). And we are doing that. But grants are dwindling. So we borrow: currently, our typical mix is 80% loans (to be repaid) and 20% grants, and from this pool we fund damage compensation. We are essentially the first country in the world to issue housing compensation during a war. Why do we do it? To keep the economy turning over. We need people to stay in Ukraine; if they leave en masse, the economy contracts further and russia pushes further along the front. We must give people housing—or at least hope.
But even this scheme doesn’t work for everyone. Some, like pensioners, simply can’t rebuild their homes even with eRecovery. The fallback is: if you can’t get eRecovery support and have no usable home, go to the Ministry of Economy’s eOselia program [a subsidized mortgage scheme] and take a bank loan to buy new housing. But that’s only for people with incomes. What about those who lost a breadwinner, or children in the war, and don’t fit any program? Worldwide, that’s what social housing is for. We call it municipal housing: a portfolio of dwellings owned by the city that cannot be privatized, bought, or sold, but where people in need can live. For us, that’s IDPs, elderly IDPs, other vulnerable groups. They pay a low rent—below market, barely cost-covering—so they can regain their footing, find work, or survive on a pension. We’re now modeling and preparing to start building such municipal housing in cities with the largest IDP concentrations—where the need is greatest. For a given family or pensioner, it means: your home is destroyed or occupied; the state offers you a modern, decent municipal flat with a modest rent. Crucially, the numbers must close—the rent should cover costs over, say, 20–30 years—otherwise the model won’t work.
VICTOR:
Do you have a sense of how many units you plan to build next year—or in five years?
ALYONA:
You’re asking exactly the right question, but…
VICTOR:
I know—it’s complicated.
ALYONA:
It is, because it depends on financing. We’re negotiating with the European Investment Bank [EIB]. Initially, we requested €300 million. With that, we could cover the immediate needs of at least 12–18 cities and test the model. How much we’ll actually sign for—I can’t say yet. We’ll see.
VICTOR:
So in the near term you’ll know how far you can persuade the Europeans to go on funding.
Why It’s So Hard to Bring Recovery Money into Ukraine
ALYONA:
These are tough conversations. The thing that shocked me most at the ministry is how hard it is to bring recovery funds into Ukraine. It’s a catastrophe.
VICTOR:
Then let me ask you to walk us through those huge tables and flowcharts. What are they?
ALYONA:
Maybe we should show them to people?
VICTOR:
We will—we’ll publish photos.
ALYONA:
It looks like an electrical wiring diagram for a building, but it’s actually the flow of how we channel money into Ukraine through banks today.
VICTOR:
How many stages—from start to finish?
ALYONA:
About 25 major stages; roughly 150 minor ones.
VICTOR:
So 150 steps from project start to receiving financing?
ALYONA:
From project start to, say, delivering a repaired school to people. Why so many? Because no international bank in history was designed to rebuild a country after a war—let alone during a war. There’s no such bank, no such institution, capable of recovery at this scale. Banks are built to make money—and a bit for development. We work with all the big multilaterals, maybe except the Asian bank we haven’t engaged yet: the EIB, Japan’s JICA [Japan International Cooperation Agency], the EBRD, the World Bank, IFC. They’re all in our portfolio. Among ministries, we have the largest portfolio and the most projects—naturally, since we build and lead recovery. Take the EIB—our largest partner. We signed a €123 million loan with them to help restore roads. We also secured something even better: a €20 million grant for solar panels on schools—so schools are energy-efficient and can stay warm in winter even with power outages. Great project; we’re very grateful. Note: these aren’t the bank’s own resources—Germany put up money for that project, others chip in for others.
To bring those funds into Ukraine, we need guarantees. State guarantees, yes—but lenders don’t accept ours because our sovereign risk is high; we’re a country at war. Even if our governance were flawless, our credit rating would still be low. So for every dollar the EIB lends us, we need the Ministry of Finance to back it one-for-one with the state budget—and we also need the European Commission’s guarantee—because our guarantee alone carries little weight. So first we run all procedures with the Ministry of Finance (which is heroically holding the country’s finances together). But budget space is tight; defense comes first. Then the European Commission allocates a guarantee envelope. Our overall recovery need is $534 billion (that’s the World Bank’s estimate with our ministry from six months ago). Last year, the Commission provided only $150 million in guarantees to back EIB operations for Ukraine—so we couldn’t channel more than that amount. This year, after hard negotiations, they raised it to $2 billion—but that’s for the entire country: energy, our projects, schools, healthcare. For next year, we’re asking to increase it by at least another $2 billion—to $4 billion. That’s step one—and it takes ages. Until the Commission and the bank agree, we can’t start. For example, this year they were supposed to approve at the start of the year—but it took them three extra months.
VICTOR:
On average, how long from initiation to launch?
ALYONA:
In a “normal,” well-oiled country, it’s typically 18–24 months from start to launch.
VICTOR:
And for us?
ALYONA:
We’re faster. Recently, we carried out the fastest ratification in EIB history—about one to one-and-a-half months in Parliament. Many of these agreements require ratification. But we still can’t outrun the banks’ timelines. Bottom line: we work hard, we’re grateful for support, we fight for new funds, push for more grants, move as fast as possible—pressing the Cabinet, Parliament, the President who must sign. Then we execute. But there are things beyond our control; even so, it still takes about a year.
And the real takeaway? These procedures—complex, convoluted—European guarantees, bank processes—they’re not designed for rebuilding a country.
VICTOR:
The procedures need to change; they must be adapted.
What people whisper about at every conference
ALYONA:
Either we need a dedicated Recovery Fund. And, frankly, that’s what people whisper about at every conference. Now our minister is saying it openly. In Rome, the President called for a recovery coalition and said there must be a fund. Moreover, as a country we insist this fund should not be filled with European taxpayers’ money—we value our partners—but with frozen russian assets. At the very least, let those assets be used to guarantee the fund—to cover the guarantees and credit risk. And who’s against this, and why? The banking system, of course. The Recovery Fund should probably be domiciled outside Ukraine—to mitigate sovereign credit risk. Then the money must flow directly to concrete projects. No more spending a year and a half just to launch a single water-pipeline project. A supervisory board votes, and funds are wired to a specific project. But for that, we also need trust—in us, in our technical expertise, in the Recovery Agency [state agency for infrastructure recovery], and in our ministry. That trust is built daily. That’s part of my job internationally.
VICTOR:
Through performance, through transparency, and through tools like the ones you’re building.
ALYONA:
Including your dashboard. Why did we ask you to build it? Because it’s very convenient for us—but for the international community it’s a game-changer. Many don’t have anything like it at home. I hope these “experiments” make everything visible.
VICTOR:
From my communications with the OECD, when you show them we’re helping the ministry set up a system that runs continuously and updates monthly—they’re stunned.
ALYONA:
Thank you for that—truly. I think it will be a major contribution to Ukraine’s recovery. We won’t be able to measure it precisely, but we’ll be able to say this dashboard was a small step that unlocked x more funding.
Take Mykolaiv’s water pipeline. The President tasked us to get water to people. An entire region cannot live without water. We understand russia blew up the Kakhovka HPP dam—but we still have to do everything possible. What do we do? We turn to international partners and top firms. There’s IGES, SUEZ , and several others who are leaders in this field. They run the numbers. Then we ask banks to finance it. The European Investment Bank was ready to finance it as a concessional loan. But we ended up financing it from the state budget. Do you know why?
VICTOR:
Because the EIB and SUEZ said, “We need two years to prepare.”
ALYONA:
Three!
VICTOR:
I didn’t guess…
ALYONA:
We’re very grateful to the EIB—this isn’t a complaint—they just weren’t created for this. They were built for large investment projects that take years and earn returns.
VICTOR:
Projects you have to prepare…
ALYONA:
…over 3–4 years. The bank told us: water in Mykolaiv—in 2027. When did we launch water in Mykolaiv? Yesterday. And we should say that out loud. I know it’s hard to ask people to praise the authorities right now—it feels impossible. But some things must be acknowledged.
VICTOR:
They should be said and shown. If I’m not mistaken, it took nine months?
ALYONA:
Nine months. The fastest infrastructure project of this scale in Eastern Europe. We pulled it off because there was synergy: the President’s directive, local government, the mayor, the governor, the Recovery Agency, our minister—everyone aligned.
VICTOR:
When we spoke with the head of the Recovery Agency on our podcast, I could see he knows the subject inside out. You can’t bluff him—he did it in his city for years. He knows the details…
ALYONA:
This is work you can’t do unless you care deeply. Mr. Sukhomlyn was the mayor of Zhytomyr—widely regarded as effective. He understands these issues down to the nuts and bolts. So when you ask him to deliver, he doesn’t just “do something.” He studies it and says, “I’ve found a way to cut costs by 30%.” Without that mindset we can’t succeed—because we don’t have money to waste. The same is true of the minister. Oleksii Kuleba served as governor of Kyiv region—appointed ten days before the invasion, if I recall correctly. He lived through the worst crisis a regional leader can face: occupation, then 70–80% destruction, then the task of recovery. He went through all of it. So now, leading national recovery, he knows what needs doing—at the scale of a very large region.
It’s a tough story. But I have to repeat what I tell foreign partners: we need a dedicated source of recovery financing. This isn’t just about reconstruction—it’s about Ukraine’s economy, about keeping people here and bringing them back, growing the tax base, needing less foreign aid and fewer loans. We can be self-sustaining—if we can rebuild. We need a Recovery Fund and a coalition of countries to contribute. We’re ready to contribute ourselves—capital, assets, in-kind. We’re ready to set up a supervisory board, maximally transparent procedures, show your dashboard, show other tools. Just give us funding and private-public partnership deal flow—so it moves fast. Without fast recovery and fast money, people won’t wait three years for water or housing. That’s simply impossible.
Does Alyona Shkrum regret leaving Parliament?
VICTOR:
They’ll leave. This is definitely not our last conversation, but to wrap up—do you regret leaving Parliament?
ALYONA:
No, I don’t. I rarely regret things, to be honest. In our circumstances, I don’t see the point. I feel lucky—since the start of the war, I don’t know what I would have done if I couldn’t be useful. I’d have woven camouflage nets, volunteered—but I was immediately thrown into international outreach, where help was needed.
VICTOR:
Communications—I remember. “Who knows Japanese to do translations?” How many languages were you translating into then?
ALYONA:
Good question—more than 50 languages.
VICTOR:
These were current news updates.
ALYONA:
We had 150–200 people on outsource translating Ukraine’s news 2–5 times a day into over 50 languages—including languages almost no one had ever targeted before: Africa, China, Japan, Korea. All of it pro bono. Lightning fast. It was incredible. Then we blasted those updates to politicians, MPs, friendship groups, journalists. It was very effective. I had an all-women “landing party”—five women MPs. We met with Boris Johnson, with Emmanuel Macron, we advocated for weapons, we worked with the European Parliament. I felt useful. Then that phase ended—we had done what MPs could do. After that, we were sent to the Global South—Latin America, Africa, Asia—for another year, fighting disinformation. russian and Chinese propaganda there was intense. It was extremely hard, and extremely interesting. Again, I felt useful.
But there’s a limit to what MPs can achieve in international outreach. You can meet people a hundred times, launch messaging, but you can’t go beyond a certain point. I started feeling I wasn’t useful—to myself, to the country, to the situation. I wanted a change and looked for it. When Oleksii Kuleba offered me this post, it was scary (staying with a parliamentary mandate is much easier—it’s what I knew). But it was super interesting and super hard. Suddenly, you must master countless new issues instantly. As a ministry, we’re responsible for everything: ports, roads, housing, protection of energy infrastructure, heat supply, water supply, IDPs, districts and municipalities, and the largest investments. It’s very demanding—but also fascinating. And the team is excellent; nothing is possible without a strong team. By the way, we’re hiring—international partnerships and energy efficiency experts. We’re rebuilding with energy efficiency across the board, and we need specialists who know how to bring money in. The energy-efficiency roles come with competitive salaries because they’re tied to EBRD and other development bank support offices.
VICTOR:
Did Dmytro try to dissuade you?
ALYONA:
No. For listeners: that’s my husband. In our family we don’t talk each other out of decisions. The only thing he worried about—and I still worry about—is our daughter. She’s one year and eight months old now; when I accepted the job, she was a little under one. We had a gentleman’s agreement with the minister: let her at least turn one, then I’ll start—because I knew the first three months would be 24/7 including weekends. We didn’t quite make it—I started a month before her first birthday. So yes, that’s what he worried about most—and so do I.
VICTOR:
How do you manage, if I may?
ALYONA:
I don’t. Of course I don’t.
VICTOR:
I’ll quote your post from five days ago: “Worst of all—we had just returned home and missed the first children’s birthday party to which Lu was invited.”
ALYONA:
Thank God it wasn’t her own birthday. It was the first party she’d ever been invited to—the boy turned two. It’s unmanageable. I don’t know if I could keep this pace for five years—or even three. But this is what we all have to do now, everyone who chose to stay in Ukraine—to contribute to victory. That’s how I see it. It’s fascinating work, and an incredible learning experience. I really hope, like any mother torn between roles, that we’ll make it up—after all, I’m doing this for her, too. I don’t want her growing up with sirens, shelling, and occupied territories. God willing. But how long can I keep going without seeing her? Of course she’s already upset. She’s small, but if I come home two nights in a row without putting her to bed—if she hasn’t seen me at all—she’s upset. She doesn’t run to me, doesn’t hug me. And that’s heartbreaking. But—what can you do.
VICTOR:
Thank you.
ALYONA:
Thank you very much.
VICTOR:
I also want to thank our defenders for giving us the chance to breathe in a free country.
ALYONA:
And to make these podcasts.
VICTOR:
And to make these podcasts.
ALYONA:
And to rebuild.
VICTOR:
And to rebuild—and to give our children the chance to live in this country.
ALYONA:
Thank you so much for having me. For me, this felt like a session of psychotherapy—I shared a bit of what’s been weighing on me. I’m happy to come back and share more.
VICTOR:
Deal. Until next time.
This text has been translated and adapted from the original Ukrainian version with the assistance of artificial intelligence. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy and clarity, some nuances may differ from the original.